Research

My main interest concerns the nature of consciousness: what it is, how we come to know it (or accrue justification for our beliefs it), and what systems realize it. My dissertation “Representing Qualia: An Epistemic Path out of the Hard Problem” — advised by Richard Fumerton — explored, what I argue is, the most common way of attempting to justify the belief that (phenomenal) consciousness cannot be explained neuroscientifically/computationally. I claim that such an approach assumes a specific relation (of acquaintance) that I argue does not exist and thus, the belief is not justified.

My project focused specifically on Frank Jackson’s Knowledge argument as a case-study and provides a unique response to the knowledge argument. It concludes by sketching an error theory for why many have assumed that the aforementioned relation exists.

My current research is focused on contributing to illusionism as a theory of consciousness. More specifically, I am interested in articulating a theory of introspection that provides us with strong justification for everyday claims about mental states but also explains why we are systematically in error when it comes to claims about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. Additionally, I am exploring theories of mental representation that allows us to confidently ascribe mental states to non-human animals.

When not thinking about consciousness, I am often thinking about the project of philosophy itself (what it is up to and what are its limits) and egalitarian theories of justice (specifically relational egalitarianism). Outside of philosophy proper, I am deeply interested in artificial intelligence, biology, neuroscience, psychology and human well-being.